James R. Savage v. Commonwealth of Virginia by unknown
J 




JAMES R. SAVAGE 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
Record 519 
FROJVI THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ACCOMAC COUNTY, VIRGINIA. 
''The briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a 
hrief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed ·ln small pica type for the inf0r 
mation of counseL 
H. STEWART JONES, Clerk. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
JAMES R. SAVAGE 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
To the H.onorable J~tdges of the Supreme Court of .Appeals 
of Virginia: · 
Your petitioner, James R. Savage, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by a judgment for $50.00, and costs, en-
tered against him by the Circuit Court of the County of Ac-
comack, Virginia, on June 15, 1927, in a certain criminal action 
then pending in said Court, wherein the Commonwealth of 
Virginia was plaintiff, and your said petitioner was defend-
ant. A transcript of the record in said action is herewith 
filed. 
The object of this petition is to obtain a writ of error and 
supersedeas to said judgment, to the end that the same may 
be reviewed and reversed. 
STATEMENT. 
The action was instituted by the Commonwealth against 
your petitioner, charging him with the violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Carriers Act of the State of Virginia, Code of Vir-
ginia, Sec. 4097, as amended, in that he was operating a motor 
truck for compensation in the State of Virginia, without first 
obtaining from the State Corporation Commission a certificate 
or permit, desip:nated as "Permit E", as provided by law. 
The case was heard and decided by the Court upon an 
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"On the 25th day of April, 1927, James R. Savage, a resi-
dent of the town of· Onancock,- in the County of Accomack, 
State of Virginia, was engaged in operating a motor truck 
over the improved public highways of the State of Virginia, 
in carrying and transporting for compensation and by pri-
vate employril.ent, but not under a regular schedule, ·or be-
tween fixed terminii bricks, from Tasley to Onancock, both of 
which towns are of the County of Accomack, State of Vir-
ginia, without having obtained from _the State Corporation 
Commission a Certificate or Permit E, as designated in the 
Code of Virginia, Section 4097 f, as amended.'' 
Your petitioner filed a demurrer in said action, and the 
Court, after a consideration of the agreed statement of facts 
and the terms of said demurrer, overruled said derimrrer, and 
entered up judgment against your petitioner. 
Your petitioner is advised and charges that the trial Court 
erred.in overruling petitioner's motion to set aside the verdict 
on the ground that the same is contrary to the law and the 
evidence. 
The issue in this case is : Whether one who is engaged in 
the transportation of property by auto truck for compensa-
tion, by private contract, over the public highways of the 
State, not between fixed terminii nor over a regular route, is 
subject to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle CarriePS Act, 
as amended. · 
Plaintiff in error is admittedly a private carrier, and not 
a common carrier. 
The question. is whether an auto truck operator desiring to 
: conduct his business in a private contract can constitutionally 
have his right to operate conditioned on first securing from 
the State Corporation Commission of Virginia a certificate 
or permit, and is thereafter by express terms declared to be. 
a common carrier. 
THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
Section 4097 c. "No corporation or person, their lessees, 
trustees, or receivers, shall operate any motor propelled ve-
hicle as hereinbefore defined for the transportation of per-
sons or property for compensation on any improved public 
·highways in this State, except in accordance with the provis-
ions of this act, and every motor vehicle carrier, as hereinbe.-
fore de1ined, is hereby declared to be a common carrier, a 
transportation company and a public service corporation with-
---- ----------·~--------~~---~----
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in the meaning of the laws of this State, and as such subject 
to control, supervision and regulation by the commission in 
the manner provided by law; but no such motor vehicle car-
rier shall be deemed to possess the power of eminent domain, 
and in the matters of fixing and regulating rates the proced-
ure shall be as provided by law for public utility companies, 
* * * " 
Your petitioner submits first, that the Virginia Motor 
Vehicle Act in so far as Sec. 4097 c is relative, takes the pri-
vate property of this petitioner in e.rror for public use without 
just .compensation, and deprives him of his property without 
due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. 
The Act by express language converts a private carrier 
into a common carrier, imposing thereon all the obligations 
and burdens of a common carrier, except it withholds the 
power of eminent domain, without the consent of the private 
carrier. 
Before developing the principal above set forth, let us an-
alyze the Virginia Motor Vehicle Act. Before the amendment 
by the Legislature of 1926, the facts stated in this case did 
not come within the scope of the Virginia statute. However, 
an amendment was· passed during the 1926 session of the Vir-
ginia Legislature, under Sec. 4097 f, and the following lan-
guage was added: 
''The commission may grant a certificate E for property 
carrying vehicles to such applicant or applicants holding 
themselves out for private employment only for the trans-
portation of specific loads or commodities for one person or 
firm on a single trip, to or from the city, town or location 
from which said carrier operates to such other cities, towns 
or locations over any improved public highway of the State, 
but who will not operate upon a regular schedule, nor solicit 
nor receive patronage along the route or between the cities, 
towns or locations served by a class D carrier. 
"Nothing in this section, ·however, shall prohibit or inter-
fere with Class E. carriers while engaged in the transporta-
tion of farm or dairy products exclusively from the farm or 
dairy to market or shipping point." 
In other words, any truck operator for hire under a pri-
vate contract, who desires to operate only as a priavte carrier, 
D 
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with no fixed terminii, no schedule, or no fixed. rates, is by the 
terms of the amendment, forced to become a common carrier, 
subjeect to all the burdens of a common carrier, and under 
the control of the ,state Corporation Commission. His rights, 
property and obligations become public and no longer private. 
Is not this clearly the conversion of private carriers into 
common carirers by legislative fiat? If this be true, then the. 
statute is clearly unconstitutional, because as said by Mr. 
Justice Sutherland in the case of Frost vs. R. R. Commission, 
271 u. s .. p. 583 : 
''That, consistently with the due process c.lause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a private carrier can not be converted 
against his will into a common carrier by mere legislative 
command, is a rule not open to doubt." * * * (See 
Michigan Public Utilities Com. vs. Duke, 266 U. S. 570; His-
sem vs. Guran, 112 Ohio. 59; Public Utilities, etc., vs. Nelson, 
65 Utah 451. 
The Virginia Motor Vehicle Act is similar in all respects 
to the California statute, which was the basis of the decision 
in the case of Frost, e't a,Zs., vs. R. R. Commission, cited 
above, except that the Virginia statute by express language 
converts private carriers into public carriers, whereas the 
California statute attempted by implication~ to make the 
change. Surely, if the California statute was unconstitu-. 
tional, as decided in the Frost case, then the Virginia statute, 
which goes farther and by express language does what the 
California st~tute tried to do by implication must of neces-
sity be unconstitutional. The Act does not purport to be, and 
is not in fact a regulation of the use of the highways of Vir-
ginia; on the other hand, it is a regulation of those who are 
engaged in certain classes of business. We submit that the 
question here is one of first impression in Virginia. While it 
is true that the right of the State to regulate the use of high-
ways by common carriers was expressly affirmed by this 
Court in the case of Gruber vs. C.om. . V a., p. . . , still t.he. 
facts of that case were totally different from the case at bar. 
In the Gr·uber case, the defendal}t was operating a bus line 
between fixed terminii, on a fixed schedule, and for certain 
fixed rates, and the question was whether or not he came with-
in the class under. the then existing statutes of having been 
in business in good faith on a certain date, and entitled to a 
certificate as a matter of right. The case was decided before 
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the amendment of 1926, and before the de.cision in the Frost 
case by the U. S. Supreme Gourt. That the State has the 
power to prohibit the use of the highways in proper cases, we 
do not deny, but that it has the power to .compel a private 
carrier to assume, against his will, the duties and burdens of 
a common carrier, we submit it does not. 
(See Mich. Pub. Util. 'Com. vs. Duke, 266 U. S. 570; Frost, 
et als., cited supra). As said in the Frost case, p. 591: 
''It is very clear that the act as thus applied is in no real 
sense a regulation of the use of the public highways. It is a 
regulation of the business of those, who are engaged in using 
them. Its primary purpose evidently is to protect the busi-
ness of these who are common carriers in fact by controlling 
competitive conditions. Protection or conservation of the 
highways is not .involved." 
· The Virginia statute takes the private property of this 
plaintiff in error for public use, without just compensation, 
and deprives him of his property without due process of law, 
and denies to him the equal protection of the laws in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 
So far as we can :find, the State under its police power, 
has the right to regulate the use of its highways,· imposing 
certain conditions for their use, but we su'bmit that the state 
can not impose such a codition as is attempted in the statute 
under consideration, by withholding the use of its highways 
to all those that use them in a certain designated class, and 
forcing private carriers to assume the status of common car-
riers, merely for such privilege. 
That the State can not by mere legislative fiat convert a 
private carrier, against his will, into a common carrier, is 
a rule not open to doubt. (See Davis vs. Mayor of N. Y., 14 
N. Y. 506; Macomber vs. N'ichols, 34 1'/lich. 212; Producers' 
Transporta.tion C.o. vs. R. R. Com,., 251 U. S. 230; Mich. Pub-
lic Utilities, etc., 'vs. Dnke, cited sttpra, and r~ferences then 
given; also Hissen vs. Gu.ran dl; Myers, 112 Ohio St. 59.) 
The case 'of Bissen vs. Guran, et al., cited supra, as con-
struing the Ohio statute, providing that any corporation or 
person engaged in the business of transporting either persons 
or property, or both, in motor vehicles for hire, over any pub-
6 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
lie highway, is a motor transportation company, and as such 
declared to be a common carrier, the court said: 
''If their business bas not in fact been dedicated to public 
use and service, any regulation would amount to a taking of 
private property for public use, and, therefore, be beyond the 
power of the State, unless just compenastion were first paid 
in money.'' 
It will he readily seen that the Ohio statute is practically 
the same as .the Virginia statute; in other words, both statutes 
by express words declare the private carrier to he a common 
carrier. As to what constitutes a common carrier, there can 
be no real controversy. The definition has been given by 
practically every state in .the Union and the Supreme Court 
ofthe United States, and are in perfect harmony. In practi-
cally every decision it is declared that to. constitute a com-
mon carrier, there must be a dedication of property to public 
use of such character that the product and service are avail-
able to the public generally and indiscriminately, and that 
the carrier must hold himself ready to serve the public indif-
ferently to the limit of his capacity. The authorities are 
equally uniform in holding that if a carrier is employed by 
one or a definite n1;1mber of persons, by a special contract, 
or for a special undertaking, he is only a private carrier. In 
the case at bar, the palintiff in error operated one truck, 
did not hold himself out to the public generally, could accept. 
a contract or decline same, did not hold himself ready to serve 
the public indiscriminately, but could accept. or decline any 
contract offered him. 
The case of Frost, et als., vs. R..R. Commission of State of 
California, cited sttpra, is apparently the last expression 
of the United States Supreme Court, and is the leading case 
in this conutry. Marion L. Frost, et als., were engaged in a 
sing-le private contract in transporting for stipulated compen- . 
sation citrus fruit over the public highways of the State of 
California, between fixed treminii. They were brought before 
the Commission charged with violating the Auto, Stage and 
Transportation Act of California (1Stat_utes of Cal. 1917, p. 
330), in that they had failed to secure from the -Commission 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Com-
mission while agreeing that plaintiffs in error were, in fact, 
private carriers, held that they were subject to the provisions 
James R. Savage v. Commonwealth .. 7 
of the Act; the Commission's finding was affirmed by the 
State Supreme Court of California, but the United .States 
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, 
reversed the decision and held that the statute was uncon-
stitutional, ln clear and decisive language. The Court said, 
at p. 592: 
''The case presented was not that of a private carrier who 
1n order to have the privilege of using the highways, is re:. 
quii.'ed merely to receive a certificate of public convenience 
and become subject to regulations appropriate to that kind 
of a carrier; but it is that of a private carrier, who, in order 
to enjoy the use of the highways, must submit to the condi-
tions of becoming a. common carrier and of being regulated 
· as such by the Railroad Commission. The certificate of pub-
. lie convenience required by Sec. 5 is exacted of a common car-
cier, and is purely incidental to that status. The require-
ment does not apply to a private carrier qua private carrier, 
but to him only in his imposed statutory character of com-
mon carrier, apart from that signification, so far as he is con~ 
cerned, it does not exist.'' 
The California statute attempted by implication to make 
private carriers into common carriers, and did not require 
private carriers who were not operating between fixed ter-
minii to obtain a permit, whereas the Virginia Statute not only 
requires all motor truck operators for hire to obtain a certifi-
cate, but in express language declares them to be common 
carriers and subject to all the burdens, duties and obliga-
tions of common carriers, except the power of eminent do-
main, which is expressly withheld from them. 
For the errors so made by the trial Court in overruling 
the demurrer, refusing to set aside the finding of the Court, 
and other errors apparent on the face of the record, your peti-
tioner submits that the judgment rendered, as aforesaid, 
should be reviewed and reversed, and your petitioner prays 
that this, his petition for writ of error a:nd supersedeas, be 
awarded, and that the judgment be reviewed and reversed; 
that the statute under review be declared unconstitutional, 
and that your petitioner be dismissed from any further prose-
cution under said statute; may process issue. 
JAMES R. SAVAGE, 
By C. M. LANKFORD, Jr., 
GEORGE L. DOUGHTY, 
His Counsel. 
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We, Ben T. Gunter and Stewart K. Powell, Attorneys 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia do 
certify that in our opinion the judgment complained of in' the. 
foregoing petition ought to be reviewed and reversed by your 
Honorable Court. · 
BEN T. GUNTER, 
STEW ART K. POWELL. 
Writ of error allowed and supersedeas awarded. Bond 
$300.00. 
JESSE F. WEST. 
Dec. 12, 1927. 
Rec 'd Dec. 13, 1927. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court for the County of Acco-
mack, at the Court House thereof, by adjournment on Wed-
nesday, the 15th day of June, A. D., 1927. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the said Court for the County of Accomack, on the 
6th day of June, A. D., 1927, a warrant in favor of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, against James R. Savage, upon which 
an appeal had been granted to said Court, was returned to 
said Clerk's Office, which warrant is in the following words 
and :figures, to-wit: 
Comonwealth of Virginia, 
Gounty of Accomack, to-wit: 
To E. P. Parks, a Dy. Sheriff of the said County: 
Whereas, E. P. Parks of the said County, has this day 
made complaint and information on oath before me, T. L. 
Northam, a Justice of the said County that James R. Savage, 
in the said County did, on the blank day of April, 1927, un-
lawfully operate and run a certain motor truck over the 
county roads and improved public highway of the State of 
Virginia, then and there carrying and transporting for com-
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pensation and by priy~te employment but not operating upon 
a regular schedule, bricks from Tasley to Onancock, in the 
aforesaid county and state, without then and there having ob-
tained from the State Corporation Comniission according to 
law a certificate or permit for such operation. These are 
therefore, in the name of the Commonwealth, to command 
you forthwith to apprehend and bring before me or some 
other justice of the said County the body of the said James 
R. Savage, .to answer the said complaint,-and be further 
dealt with according to law, and you are. also directed to 
summon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . as witnesses. 











T. L. NORTHAM, J. P. (L. S.). 
On. motion of the defendant an appeal is allowed him to the 
Circuit Court of Accomack County. · 
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May 31, 1927.0 
And on this same day, to-wit: 
Circuit Court of the County of Accomack, on Wednesday, 
the 15th day of June, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hun· 
dred and twenty-seven. 
The Comonwealth, Plt:ff., 
against 
James R. Savage, Deft. 
Upon an Appeal. 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, 
and the said defendant appeared by George L. Doughty and 
Charles M. Lankford, Jr., his Attorneys. Whereupon, the 
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said defendant, by his attorneys, with the consent of the 
Court, filed a demurrer in writing to the said Warrant, which 
demurrer being fully argued, the same is overruled, to which 
ruling of the Court the said defendant, by his said Attorneys, 
excepted. And, thereupon, the said defendant, by his said At-
torneys, pleaded not guilty to the said warrant, and with the 
consent of the Attorney for the Commonwealth submitted this 
caBe to the Court for trial. And, thereupon, an agreed state-
ment of facts having been submitted to the Court, and the 
Court having considered the same and the arguments of coun-
. sPl, the Court finds the said defendant guilty in manner and 
form as in the said Warrant against him is alleged and as-
sessed against him a fine of Fifty Dollars ($50.00). And, 
thereupon, the said defendant, by his said attorneys, moved 
the Court to set aside the said finding of the Court and grant 
him a new trial herein on the ground that the same is contrary 
to the law and the evidence, which motion being thereupon 
fully argued, the same is overruled, to which ruling of the 
Court, the defendant, by his said Attorneys, excepted. 
Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the Common-
wealth recover against the said defendant Fifty Dollars 
($50.00), the fine by the Court assessed, and its costs by it 
about its prosecution in this behalf expended. And the said 
defendant, by his said attorneys, stating to the 
page 3 ~ Court that he thinks himself aggrieved by the judg-
ment aforesaid, and is desirous of applying to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of this State for a Writ of Error 
and Supersedeas to the said Judgment, it is ordered that the 
execution of the said Judgment be suspended f"or a period of 
sixty days from this day in order to enable the said defend-
ant to perfect his said appeal to said Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of this State for a Writ of Error and Supersedeas to 
the said Judgment, provided the said defendant execute a 
bond before this Court or the Clerk thereof, in his office, in 
the penalty of Tvvo Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250.00), 
with good and sufficient surety, conditioned that he, the said 
James R. Savage, shall immediately, upon the expiration of 
said sixty days for which the said judgment is suspended, 
abide by and perform the said judgment in case the Writ of 
Error and Supersedeas aforesaid is refused, or being granted, 
he, the said James R Savage, fails to prosecute the same 
with effect. And, thereupon, the said James R. Savage, with 
Burton M. Revell, his surety, executed the said bond in open 
Court, the said surety being by the Court sufficient. And, 
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thereupon, the defendant tendered his certificates o.f excep-
tion numbers 1 and 2, which certificates of exception are re-
ceived, signed and sealed by the court, and ordered to be 
made a part of the record in this _cause. 
Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
vs. 
James R. Savage. 
DEMURRER. 
' : i. 
The said defendant says that the warrant in this action is 
not sufficient in law, and states the grounds of demurrer re-
lied upon to be as follows: 
That the action complained of is not an offense under the 
' laws of the State of Virginia, for the reason that the statute 
under which the said warrant was issued is unconstitutional, 
in that it takes private property for public use with-
page 4 ~ out just compensation, deprives the defendant of 
his property without due process of law, and denies 
him the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 
Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Comonwealth of Virginia 
vs. 
James R. Savage. 
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On the 25th day of April, 1927, James R. Savage, a resi-
dent of the town of Onancock, in the County of 4ccomack, 
State of Virginia, was engaged in operating a motor truck 
over the improved public highways of the State of Virginia, 
in carrying and transporting for compensation and by private 
employment, but not under a regular schedule, or between 
fixed terminii, bricks, from Tasley to Onancock, both of which 
towns are of the County of Accomack, state of Virginia, with-
·o-q.t having obtained from the State Corporation Commission 
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a Certificate or permit E, as designated in the Code of Vir-
ginia, Section 4097 f, as amended. 
Virginia, 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
By JEFF F. WALTER, 
atty. for the Commonwealth. 
JAMES R. SAVAGE, 
By GEORGE L. DOUGHTY, 
CHARELS M. LANKFORD, Jr., 
his attorneys. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS # 1. 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
vs. 
James R. Savage. 
Unlawfully operating a motor truck without having first ob-
tained permit and certificate as required by law. 
Bie it remembered, that at the trial of this cause the defend-
aut, to maintain the issue on his behalf, filed a de-
.page 5 ~ murrer to the warrant in said cause, stating the 
grounds in said demurrer as follows: 
"That the action complained ofis not an offense under the 
laws of the State of Virginia, for the reason that the statute 
under which said warrant was issued is unconstitutional in 
that it takes private property for public use without just 
compenastion, deprives the defendant of his property without 
due process of law, and denies him the equal protection of the 
laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution.'' 
That after argument before the Court on said demurrer, 
the Court overruled said demurrer, to which ruling of the 
Court the defendant excepted, and prays the Court to sign, 
seal and make a part of the record this, his first bill of excep-
tions, which is accordingly done this 15th day of June, A. D., 
1927. 
N. B. \VESTCOTT, Judge. (Seal) 
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BILL OF EXCEPTION NO .. 2. 
Virginia, 
..:..:...:,. ..... 
In the Circuit Court of Accomack County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
vs. . 
James R. Savage. 
Unlawfully operating a motor truck without having :first 
obtained permit and certificate as required by law. 
Be it remembered, that at the trial of this cause the defend-
ant, to further maintain the issue on his behalf, pleaded not 
·guilty, waived a jury, and upon an agreed statement of facts 
signed by the defendant, through his attorneys, George L. 
Doughty, Charles M. Lankford, Jr., and by the Attorney for 
the Commonwealth, Jeff F. Walter, on motion of said de-
fendant, by his attorneys, and with the consent of said Com-
monwealth's Attorney, this cause was submitted to the Judge 
to be heard by him upon the agreed statement of facts. 
Whereupon, the Court having considered the agreed state-
ment of facts and the law relative thereto, entered up a judg-
ment against said defendant, assessing against him 
page 6 ~ a. fine of $50.00 and costs. Thereupon, the said de-
fendant, by his attorney, moved the said Court to 
set aside said verdict, or judgment, on the ground that it was 
contrary to the law and the evidence. Whereupon, the 
Court overruled said motion and entered up judgment ac-
cordingly, to which ruling of the Court the defendant excepted, 
and prays the Court to sign, seal and make a. part of the rec-
ord this, his second bill of exceptions, which is accordingly 
done this 15th day of June, A. D., 1927. 
N. B. WESTCOTT, Judge. (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
County of Acomack, to-wit: 
I, John D. Grant., Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court for the 
County of Accomack and State of Virginia, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record and pro-
ceeding in the appeal warrant of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. against James R. Savage, pending in said Court. And 
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I further certify that it appears by a writing filed in the pa-
pers of said cause that the plaintiff has been duly notified of 
the defendant's intention to have the foregoing transcript 
made out. The cost of the foregoing transcript of the record 
is $3.50, and is charged to the defendant. 
_ JOHN D. GRANT, Jr., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court for the County of 
Accomack, in the State of Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
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